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We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly
generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players
learn. The trajectories in the strategy space display a range of qualitatively different behaviors,
with attractors that include unique fixed points, multiple fixed points, limit cycles and chaos. In the
limit where the game is complicated, in the sense that the players can take many possible actions, we
use a generating-functional approach to establish the parameter range in which learning dynamics
converge to a stable fixed point. The size of this region goes to zero as the number of players goes to
infinity, suggesting that complex non-equilibrium behavior, exemplified by chaos, may be the norm
for complicated games with many players.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many branches of science are interested in systems made
up of a large number of competing individuals. Exam-
ples range from financial markets and other social sys-
tems, to populations undergoing biological evolution, to
networked computer systems. In many such situations
individuals compete for limited resources, and the natu-
ral model is a game, which consists of a set of players who
at any point in time choose from a set of possible actions
in an attempt to maximize their payoff. Game theory
has received a great deal of attention since the mid-20th
century [1], but research has overwhelmingly focused on
simple games, with only a very small number of players
and pure strategies, even though real game-like systems
often involve large numbers of individuals and possible
strategies. While many of the observed properties of sim-
ple games carry over directly to more complicated ones,
it is becoming increasingly clear that complicated games
can show important types of behavior not found in sim-
pler systems.
Early work in game theory focused on the concept of
equilibria, in particular the famous Nash equilibrium [2],
in which the players adopt strategies such that no player
can improve her own payoff by unilaterally changing her
own strategy. The strategies at a Nash equilibrium can
be probabilistic combinations of pure strategies, called
mixed strategies. Nash’s ideas have been particularly in-
fluential in economics, where agents are often assumed
to adopt Nash equilibria. It should be emphasized that
this is a behavioral assumption, and that the empirical
evidence for this is mixed [3].
∗ james.sanders-2@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
† tobias.galla@manchester.ac.uk
‡ doyne.farmer@oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk
Equilibrium models are perfectly plausible in the context
of simple games when there is a unique Nash equilibrium
that is easy to calculate. In complicated games, there are
typically numerous distinct Nash equilibria [4, 5], and lo-
cating even one of them can be a laborious task: the
computing time of the best known algorithms increases
exponentially with the size of the game [6]. This seems
to cast doubt on whether it is reasonable to assume that
players of complicated games naturally discover equilib-
ria. But if they don’t play equilibria, what do they do in-
stead? And is there a way to determine a priori whether
players will converge to a unique Nash equilibrium using
a reasonable learning strategy?
Opper and Diederich studied replicator dynamics, a stan-
dard model of biological evolution, in the context of com-
plicated games. They found that the dynamics con-
verges to a unique fixed point in some regions of pa-
rameter space, but that in other regions, the dynamics
does not settle down [7, 8]. Sato and co-workers showed
that adaptation learning can result in chaotic dynamics
even in low-dimensional games [9–11]. Building on this
earlier work, Galla and Farmer studied complicated two-
player games in which the strategies are randomly gen-
erated but fixed in time, assuming that players use an
experience-weighted attraction dynamics to learn their
strategies [12]. They found that there are distinct re-
gions of the parameter space with different behaviors.
When the timescale for learning is short and the payoffs
of the players are strongly negatively correlated, they ob-
served convergence to unique fixed points. But when the
time scale for learning is long and when the payoffs are
less negatively correlated they observed limit cycles and
chaos. And when the timescale for learning is long and
the payoffs are positively correlated they observed a large
multiplicity of stable fixed points.
In this paper we extend the work of [12] to p-player games
and find that, for large numbers of players, complex dy-
namics is not merely frequent but ubiquitous. The region
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2of parameter space in which the players’ strategies consis-
tently converge to a unique fixed point appears to vanish
as p → ∞. This suggests that complex non-equilibrium
behavior may be the norm in dynamics on complicated
games with many players, at least under the type of learn-
ing we study here.
Our goal can be understood through an analogy to fluid
flow. It is well known that fluid flow can be characterized
a priori in terms of a few key parameters that can be es-
timated on the back of an envelope. The most famous of
these is the Reynolds number, which is a non-dimensional
ratio of stress and viscosity. Though the precise transi-
tion point depends on other parameters, if the Reynolds
number is high then the flow is likely to be turbulent.
Our goal here is similar: We seek parameters that can
characterize a priori whether or not a game will exhibit
complex dynamics in the strategy space as the players
learn. Here we are particularly interested in what hap-
pens as the number of players increases. Since the pres-
ence of many players makes the game more complex, we
hypothesize that it will tend to make the strategy dy-
namics more complex as well. (And indeed this is what
we observe).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Sec. II we introduce the experience-weighted attraction
learning algorithm and we define what we mean by a com-
plex p-player game. Sec. III then contains an overview
of the different types of behavior seen in the learning of
such games, along with a more quantitive analysis based
on numerical simulations. In Sec. IV we then turn to
a semi-analytical study of p-player learning based on a
generating-functional approach. This technique allows
us to derive estimates for the boundaries of stable and
complex behavior in parameter space for games with a
large number of strategies. We then turn to a brief dis-
cussion of volatility clustering and the relevance of our
result for the modeling of financial markets in Sec. VI,
before we summarize our results. The Appendix con-
tains further details of the numerical methods used to
identify the different types of dynamical behavior, and of
the generating functional analysis. It also contains some
additional numerical results.
II. MODEL
II.1. Experience-weighted attraction
Suppose that a set of players repeatedly play a game in
which they each choose from a distinct set of strategies,
without conferring with each other. The players have
good memories and a full understanding of the payoffs
that a given combination of strategies would yield for
them, and are only interested in maximizing their own
payoffs. We are interested in the case where the players
learn their strategies based on past experience. A com-
mon approach assumes the players adapt behavior over
time based on the past success of each possible strategy
[13–16]. The basic idea is that the players calculate a
numerical score, known as an ‘attraction’ or ‘propensity’,
for each possible strategy, describing how successful they
expect it to be. They then select a strategy based on
the relative score of each possible action, play the game
one or more times, then use the outcome to update their
attractions for future play. This defines an adaptation
process, in which agents learn from past experience and
continuously try to improve their actions.
Two types of simple learning models have proved espe-
cially popular over the years. In reinforcement learning,
the players calculate the attraction of a strategy based
on how successful it has been when they have employed
it in the past. In belief-based learning, the attractions
are determined according to how successful the possible
strategies would have been, had they been used in prior
iterations. The experience-weighted attraction (EWA)
system, introduced by Camerer and Ho [13], combines
these two approaches into a single algorithm—in fact,
belief-based learning can be seen as a deterministic limit
of reinforcement learning in which the players sample all
pure strategies at each time step. Combined with a logit
model of how the players choose strategies based on their
attractions, EWA is observed to be a reasonably good
match for how people learn to play simple games [14, 15].
We are interested in how often EWA converges to equilib-
ria, so we select the deterministic (belief-based) version
of the model. While the noisy (reinforcement) version
may well perform stochastic oscillations about equilibria
in the right conditions, we would expect that in general,
the introduction of noise would lead to complex dynamics
being observed even more often. Both cases were stud-
ied by Galla and Farmer and the differences were not
dramatic (see the Supplementary Material of [12]).
Consider a p-player game, where each player has N ac-
tions to choose from. The rewards for the players are
defined by the generalised payoff matrix Πµi,iµ+1,...,iµ−1 ,
which represents the payoff to player µ if they play ac-
tion i, while the other players µ + 1, . . . , µ − 1 play ac-
tions iµ+1, . . . , iµ−1, respectively (where the subscripts
labelling the players are to be interpreted modulo p).
We use updates rules similar to those of [12], but adapted
to the multi-player game,
xµi (t+ 1) =
exp[βQµi (t)]∑
k exp[βQ
µ
k(t)]
,
Qµi (t+ 1) = (1− α)Qµi (t) +
∑
iµ+1,...,iµ−1
Πµi,iµ+1,...,iµ−1
∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t).
(1)
Here x represents the players’ strategies, with xµi (t) de-
noting the probability that player µ will choose action i
at time t. The value Qµi (t) is player µ’s attraction to ac-
tion i at time t. The two parameters of the system are
the memory loss rate α, which lies in the interval [0, 1],
and the intensity of choice β, which is non-negative. A
player’s attraction to an action is essentially a geometri-
3cally discounted average of the payoffs that would have
been achieved by playing that action in earlier time steps,
with a discount factor determined by α. The intensity of
choice β determines the bias with which players choose
actions with higher attractions—if β = 0, then the play-
ers ignore the attractions and choose each action with
equal probability, while in the limit as β →∞, the play-
ers each choose their most attractive action with proba-
bility 1. The intensity of choice therefore plays a similar
role to the inverse temperature in thermodynamics.
Our system is identical to that studied by Galla and
Farmer in reference [12], except that they restricted the
number of players to be p = 2. Our contribution is to
understand how this changes as p becomes larger. The
system of Camerer and Ho [14, 15], as well as allowing for
noise, allows the intensity of choice β to vary over time.
In the present work we assume that it has attained its
long-term value. Thus the dynamics we study here are a
special case of [14, 15].
The attractions Qµi can be eliminated from the update
rules in Eq. (1) to yield
xµi (t+ 1) =
1
Zµ(t)
xµi (t)
1−α
× exp
β ∑
iµ+1,...,iµ−1
Πµi,iµ+1,...,iµ−1
∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t)
 , (2)
where
Zµ(t) =
∑
k
xµk(t)
1−α
exp
β ∑
iµ+1,...,iµ−1
Πµk,iµ+1,...,iµ−1
∏
κ 6=µ
xκiκ(t)
(3)
is a normalization factor.
Following [12], we focus on the continuous-time limit of
the EWA system. Letting
r = β/α,
this limit is found by keeping r fixed while taking α→ 0
and β → 0 simultaneously, and rescaling time. Both the
geometric discounting of the past profits of an action and
the logit selection remain significant in this limit. This
yields the so-called Sato-Crutchfield dynamics [9, 10]
x˙µi (t)
xµi (t)
= −1
r
lnxµi (t)+
∑
iµ+1,...,iµ−1
Πµi,iµ+1,...,iµ−1
∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t)−ρµ(t),
(4)
where ρµ(t) = lnZµ(t)/β. A detailed derivation can be
found for example in the Supplementary Material of [12].
Note that, since each player satisfies the constraint that
the probability of taking any given action sums to one,
the resulting dynamical system for the learning dynamics
is of dimension (N − 1)p.
We assume throughout this work that α and β are small
enough that the continuous limit is a good approxima-
tion. We take this limit mainly for analytical conve-
nience; the continuous limit is easier to study, as it has
only one relevant parameter, the ratio of α to β.
When considering large values of N it is convenient to
rescale the probabilities xµi (t) so that they sum to N for
each player. This means that xµi (t) = O (1), and so the
objects inside the exponentials in Eq. (2) remain finite
as N → ∞. This can be achieved by modifying the
definition of the normalization factors Zµ accordingly.
The payoff matrix entries are rescaled as well as explained
below.
II.2. Constructing typical complicated games with
p players
We are interested in the behavior of the EWA system for
generic complicated games. To that end, we draw the
payoff matrix Π from a multivariate normal distribution
with〈
Πµiµ,iµ+1,...,iµ−1Π
ν
iν ,iν+1,...,iν−1
〉
=
{
1
Np−1 µ = ν
Γ
(p−1)Np−1 µ 6= ν
(5)
and all other correlations zero. The multivariate Gaus-
sian distribution is a natural choice because it is the max-
imum entropy distribution when there are constraints on
the first and second moments. We have chosen the con-
struction above because it yields the only possible multi-
variate Gaussian distribution that satisfies the following
properties: (i) the distribution is symmetric with respect
to the different players and pure strategies (that is, swap-
ping any two players or pure strategies would leave the
distribution unchanged) and (ii) the payoffs for any two
distinct choices of actions are uncorrelated (by choice of
actions we mean the tuple (i1, . . . , ip) representing the
pure strategies played by the p players). As before, we
wish to emphasize that once Π is chosen it remains fixed
through the duration of the iterated game.
The parameter Γ can be seen as the level of ‘zero-
sumness’ of the game, and must lie on the interval
[−1, p − 1]. When Γ = p − 1, any outcome of the game
leads to each player receiving the same payoff with proba-
bility 1. When Γ = 0, all payoffs are uncorrelated. When
Γ = −1, for any given outcome, the players’ payoffs sum
to zero with probability 1. Therefore Γ can be seen as
a ‘competition parameter’—at large positive values, the
players have common goals, while at large negative val-
ues, they are working against each other.
When p = 2, the possible values of Γ span the range
−1 ≤ Γ ≤ 1. However when p > 2 the situation becomes
more complicated. Eq. (5) indicates that the payoffs each
have variance 1/Np−1, the correlations between payoffs
for different outcomes are uncorrelated, and the correla-
tion between the payoffs of two different players for any
given outcome is Γ/((p − 1)Np−1). The scaling of the
payoff matrix elements with N−(p−1) ensures that the
objects inside the exponentials in Eq. (2) remain finite
4as N →∞, so that both the memory-loss (α) and payoff
(β) factors remain significant in this limit.
II.3. Strategy for exploring the parameter space
For a p-player game the payoff “matrices” each have p
indices, and so are not two dimensional matrices in the
normal usage of the world, but are p-dimensional. This
significantly complicates the problem of exploring the pa-
rameter space numerically. For a game in which a single
player can take one of N actions the payoff matrix for a
single player has Np components; for p players there are
pNp components. For p = 10 and N = 10, for example,
this means that 1011 (a hundred billion) random numbers
must be generated in order to construct the game. The
sheer amount of memory needed for simulation creates a
serious bottleneck.
Given the numerical constraints this forces us to rely
more heavily on the analytic calculation than Galla and
Farmer did when they explored two-player games. We
use numerical simulations to get a feeling for the behav-
ior of the system, with relatively small values of N and p.
In parallel we perform an analytic calculation of the sta-
bility boundary between the region where there is unique
convergence to a fixed point and the rest of the parameter
space. We then compare the analytic and numerical sim-
ulations and demonstrate that the analytic calculation
seems to be reasonably accurate, given the magnitude of
the finite-size effects. Finally we use the analytic calcu-
lation to assess the behavior in the limit where N → ∞
and p is large.
III. NUMERICAL EXPLORATION OF THE
PARAMETER SPACE
III.1. Overview
In this section we give an overview of our numerical ex-
ploration of the parameter space. As observed by Galla
and Farmer, the strategies of the players can converge
to any of the possible types of attractors, including fixed
points, limit cycles and chaos. In some regimes a given
game may have multiple fixed points, i.e. multiple basins
of attraction, but we have not observed this when the at-
tractors are limit cycles or chaos. In Fig. 1 we show
some examples. The chaotic behavior can be low dimen-
sional, as shown in the middle row, or high dimensional,
as shown in the last row. For high-dimensional chaos a
given action typically has epochs in which it is almost
never selected and others in which it is used frequently –
the range of variation is striking.
When the system converges to a fixed point, it usually
does so rather quickly, as shown in Fig. 2(a). How-
ever there are sometimes long metastable chaotic-looking
transients that suddenly collapse to a fixed point, as
shown in Fig. 2(b). This is particularly likely for small
values of α/β and small positive Γ (i.e., for weakly posi-
tively correlated payoffs and players with long memories).
Although the boundaries can be a bit fuzzy, the param-
eter space divides into distinct regions. These are illus-
trated in the schematic diagram in Fig. 3. We briefly
describe the main features:
Positively correlated payoffs: For Γ > 0 and large α/β
the dynamics converge to a unique fixed point. Holding
Γ constant, for small α/β the dynamics converges to one
of multiple fixed points, see also Fig. A3.
Negatively correlated payoffs: For Γ < 0 and large α/β
the dynamics converge to a unique fixed point (just as for
Γ > 0). Holding Γ constant, for small α/β the dynamics
are chaotic. This corresponds to longer memory. As Γ
increases from Γ = −1 to Γ = 0 the size of the chaotic
region increases. The stability boundary dividing the re-
gion with complex dynamics from the unique equilibrium
shifts to the right (i.e. toward a larger value of α/β) as
the number of players increases.
Uncorrelated payoffs: Limit cycles are common near the
boundaries, particularly near the boundary where Γ ≈ 0,
see also Figs. A1 and A2 in the Appendix. In general the
behaviors reported here are not strict, in the sense that
generating different payoff matrices with the same values
of α/β can result in different behaviors, particularly near
the boundaries. We conjecture that these are finite size
effects, so that the boundaries would become distinct and
the behavior at a given set of parameters would become
crisp in the limit as N →∞.
Prevalence of chaotic dynamics: The key result is that
as the number of players increases the size of the region
with complex dynamics grows. If Γ > 0, this means that
the region with multiple fixed points becomes larger; if
Γ < 0 this means that the region with chaotic dynamics
becomes larger. More players make the system less likely
to converge to a unique equilibrium. This is particularly
important for zero sum games (Γ = −1); in this case for
p = 2 chaos is only observed in the limit as α/β → 0,
whereas for p > 2 chaos is observed over a finite interval
in α/β.
As already mentioned, it is not possible to perform nu-
merical experiments for large values of both p and N . We
will present some numerical evidence for these results,
but they make more sense when guided by the theory.
IV. GENERATING FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
We now turn to treat the learning dynamics analyti-
cally. In the language of the theory of disordered sys-
tem the random payoff matrix in our problem represents
quenched disorder. Techniques from spin glass physics
can be applied to study the thermodynamic limit (i.e,
the limit of large payoff matrices, N → ∞). We use the
Martin-Siggia-Rose generating functional to derive an ef-
fective dynamics. For a recent review of these methods
5(a) Limit cycle (α = 0.038).
(b) Low-dimensional chaos (α = 0.037).
(c) High-dimensional chaos (α = 0.01).
FIG. 1. Time series and phase plots showing complex dynamics under EWA learning, including (a) limit cycle, (b) low
dimensional chaos, and (c) high dimensional chaos. The game has three players (p = 3) and N = 20 possible actions, with
β = 0.05 and Γ = −0.5. The time series plots on the left show the probability xµi for player µ to use action i as a function of
time for five different actions, and the phase plots on the right shows the probability for two of the actions as a function of each
other. Case (a) illustrates that limit cycles can have complicated geometric forms and long periods. For smaller values of α/β
and negative Γ, chaos is very common, ranging from low-dimensional chaotic attractors as shown in (b) to high dimensional
attractors as shown in (c). Note that for high dimensional chaos the probability that a given action is used at different points
in time can vary by as much as a factor of 1020.
see [17].
Broadly speaking the calculation proceeds as follows: in a
first step the average over the disorder (the random pay-
off matrices) is carried out and the effective dynamics is
derived. This process is subject to coloured noise, and
reflects the statistics over all games within the Gaussian
ensemble. In a second step, a fixed point of this dynam-
ics is assumed. We investigate the linear stability of this
fixed point, and calculate the boundary to the phase in
parameter space where more complex dynamics are seen.
Thus we cannot calculate where the dynamics follow limit
cycles or chaos, but we can calculate the boundary be-
tween the unique stable fixed point and other behaviors.
As discussed later, we can only do this for Γ < 0. We note
6FIG. 2. Trajectories for EWA system leading to a fixed point
in a three-player game. Panel (a) shows an instance in which
a fixed point is reached relatively quickly. Panel (b) illustrates
a metastable chaotic transient eventually collapsing to a fixed
point. In both examples each player has a choice of N = 20
possible actions and the intensity of choice is β = 0.05. A
random sample of five of the players’ strategy components xµi
are plotted. Remaining parameters are α = 0.1, Γ = −0.5) in
panel (a), and α = 0.01, Γ = 0.1 in panel (b).
that similar calculations have been carried out for repli-
cator dynamics on two-player and in multi-player games
[7, 18], see also [19] for approaches to p-player random
games using static replica methods.
IV.1. Effective process
The first step is to set up a generating functional to
describe the probability measure of all possible paths
of the dynamics. Performing the average over the as-
signment of payoff matrices an ‘effective dynamics’ can
then be derived. This calculation is based on path inte-
grals, and somewhat lengthy. We do not report it here
in the main paper, instead details are relegated to Ap-
pendix A1. The outcome of the calculation is a stochastic
integro-differential equation for the evolution of the dis-
tribution of components x(t) of the players’ strategies in
(a) Positive Γ
(b) Negative Γ
FIG. 3. Schematic phase diagrams describing the observed
long-term behavior of the p-player EWA system for large but
finite N . In (a) Γ > 0, meaning players’ payoffs are positively
correlated. Here we observe a unique stable equilibrium for
large α/β and multiple stable equilibria for small α/β. In
(b) Γ < 0, meaning players’ payoffs are anti-correlated. Here
we once again observe a unique stable equilibrium for large
α/β, but we now observe chaos for small α/β. Limit cycles
are common near the boundaries, particularly near Γ ≈ 0.
We show the case for p = 2; as the number of players is
increased the stability boundaries move to the right, but little
else changes. The heat map is subjective.
the large-N limit. This process is of the form
x˙(t)
x(t)
= Γ
∫
dt′G(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t′)
−1
r
lnx(t)− ρ(t) + η(t), (6)
where η(t) is a colored Gaussian random variable satis-
fying 〈η(t)η(t′)〉∗ = C(t, t′)p−1 and 〈η(t)〉∗ = 1. We use〈·〉∗ to denote an average over realizations of the effec-
tive dynamics. The dynamical order parameters C(t, t′)
and G(t, t′) are correlation and response functions of the
7learning dynamics. They are determined from
G(t, t′) =
〈
δx(t)
δη(t′)
〉
∗
, C(t, t′) = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉∗ . (7)
The effective process in Eq. (6) together with Eqs. (7)
define a self-consistent system for C and G. The func-
tion ρ(t) in the effective process is a Lagrange multiplier
ensuring normalization. It is defined such that 〈x〉∗ = 1.
Note that in the derivation of the effective dynamics, it
is assumed that each component of each player’s strategy
is initially drawn from an identical distribution.
IV.2. Fixed point solution
We now focus on the dynamics at large values of α/β.
Numerical simulations of the learning dynamics suggest
that one unique stable fixed point is found for any one
realization of the game in this regime. We therefore make
a fixed point ansatz for the effective dynamics. In such
a stationary fixed point regime the response function
G(t, t′) becomes a function of the time difference only,
i.e., G(t, t′) = G(t − t′), while the correlation function
tends to a constant, C(t, t′) ≡ q, see also [7, 12, 18] for
further details. Within the fixed-point ansatz the ran-
dom variable η(t) in Eq. (6) tends to a constant value
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
variance qp−1. Fixed points of the effective dynamics are
then found from
x∗
(
Γqp−2χx∗ − 1
r
lnx∗ + η∗ − ρ∗
)
= 0, (8)
where q =
〈
(x∗)2
〉
∗ and χ =
∫∞
0
dτ G(τ), and x∗, η∗, and
ρ∗ are the fixed point values of x, η, and ρ, respectively.
We can write η∗ = q(p−1)/2z, where z is a standard Gaus-
sian random variable. Then, dropping the stars, we have
x(z)
(
Γqp−2χx(z)− 1
r
lnx(z) + q
p−1
2 z − ρ
)
= 0, (9)
where χ, q, and ρ are to be determined from〈
∂x(z)
∂z
〉
∗
= q
p−1
2 χ,〈
x(z)2
〉
∗ = q,
〈x(z)〉∗ = 1. (10)
These relations can be re-written as∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
∂x(z)
∂z
= q
p−1
2 χ,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x(z)2 = q,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x(z) = 1, (11)
where Dz = dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2.
The relation in Eq. (9) can be re-arranged to give an ex-
plicit expression for x(z) in terms of the so-called Lam-
bert W function W (·). The value W (y) is defined as
the solution of the equation WeW = y. Restricting W
and y to the real line, the solution exists for y ≥ −1/e.
It is uniquely defined for y ≥ 0 and double valued for
−1/e < y < 0. We find
x = − 1
Γrqp−2χ
W
(
−Γrqp−2χer(q(p−1)/2z−ρ)
)
. (12)
We note that it is not clear that Eq. (12) has valid so-
lutions for all choices of the model parameters. If these
do not exist the fixed point ansatz is invalid, and so we
do not expect the dynamics to settle down. There may
also be instances in which Eq. 9 has multiple solutions
for x for a given value of the standard Gaussian variable
z. In principle the distribution of fixed points could be
composed of any mixture of these solutions. If the argu-
ment of the Lambert function is positive however, there
is a unique and well defined solution, x(z), for any value
of z. Throughout this discussion it is important to keep
in mind that the macroscopic order parameters q, χ and
ρ are to be determined self-consistently via Eqs. (11).
IV.3. Stability analysis
By numerically solving the fixed point equations, we see
that for a given value of p, stable fixed points exist for
large values of 1/r but not for small values. We now
proceed to determine the boundary of stability. Suppose
the effective process in Eq. (6) is perturbed from a fixed
point by a small noise term ξ(t). We then have
x˙(t) = x(t)
[
Γ
∫
dt′G(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t′)
−1
r
lnx(t)− ρ(t) + η(t) + ξ(t)
]
. (13)
We assume that ξ(t) is white Gaussian noise of unit am-
plitude. Writing x(t) = x∗ + x̂(t) and η(t) = η∗ + η̂(t),
and keeping only linear terms in ξ, x̂, and η̂, we obtain
˙̂x(t) = −1
r
x̂(t) + x∗
[
Γ
∫
dt′G(t− t′)C(t− t′)p−2x̂(t′)
+η̂(t) + ξ(t)
]
. (14)
Defining H(t, t′) = G(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2, and taking the
Fourier transform of Eq. (14), yields(
iω + r−1
x∗
− ΓH˜(ω)
)
x˜(ω) = η˜(ω) + ξ˜(ω), (15)
where the tildes denote Fourier transforms. This leads to
the relation〈
|x˜(ω)|2
〉
∗
=
(
(p− 1) 〈(x∗)2〉p−2∗ 〈|x˜(ω)|2〉∗ +
〈∣∣∣ξ˜(ω)∣∣∣2〉
∗
)
×
〈
|A(ω, x∗)|−2
〉
∗
, (16)
8where
A(ω, x∗) = iω + r
−1
x∗
− ΓH˜(ω). (17)
We can write this as〈
|x˜(ω)|2
〉
∗
=
(〈
|A(ω, x∗)|−2
〉−1
∗
− (p− 1)qp−2
)−1
.
(18)
The left-hand side is positive by definition so the cal-
culation runs into a contradiction if the expression on
the right-hand side turns negative. As it approaches zero
(from above) the magnitude of fluctuations diverges. The
fixed point can only be stable when〈
|A(ω, x∗)|−2
〉
∗
<
1
(p− 1) 〈(x∗)2〉p−2∗
. (19)
Following [7] we focus on ω = 0, so stability can only be
expected provided that〈∣∣∣∣ 1rx∗ − Γqp−2χ
∣∣∣∣−2
〉
∗
<
1
(p− 1)qp−2 , (20)
i.e.,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
(
1
rx(z)
− Γqp−2χ
)−2
≤ 1
(p− 1)qp−2 . (21)
For negative values of Γ, the position of the stability
boundary can be determined straightforwardly by nu-
merically solving Eqs. (11,12) for a given set of model
parameters, and by subsequently evaluating the stabil-
ity condition Eq. (21) throughout parameter space. As
already mentioned, this procedure fails for Γ > 0.
IV.4. The large-p limit
In general the location of the stability region defined by
(21) cannot be determined fully analytically. However,
it is possible to make progress in several limits as shown
below and make a good sketch of the behavior when Γ <
0.
Taking Γ → 0 in Eq. (9) we find x(z) =
exp
[
r(q(p−1)/2z − ρ)], and using Eq. (11) the order pa-
rameters r, q, and ρ satisfy
χ = r,
exp(r2qp−1) = q,
ρ =
ln q
2r
, (22)
in this limit. The second expression is equivalent to
q =
(
−W
(−(p− 1)r2)
(p− 1)r2
)1/(p−1)
, (23)
where W (·) is the Lambert W function. For (p− 1)r2 >
1/e this has no solutions. For (p− 1)r2 < 1/e it has two,
given by the two branches of the Lambert W function.
The solution corresponding to the upper branch (W >
−1) satisfies (21) so is always stable, while the other is
always unstable. Therefore, on the Γ = 0 line, there is a
stable fixed point only for large values of 1/r, with the
stability boundary given by
r = χ =
1√
(p− 1)e ,
q = exp
(
1
p− 1
)
,
ρ =
1
2
√
e
p− 1 . (24)
For Γ = −1 and p = 2 the system is stable as soon as
there is non-zero memory loss (α > 0), that is to say the
stability line passes through the point (1/r = 0,Γ = −1)
when p = 2, see also [12]. For larger numbers of players
we find that the stability boundary never reaches the
1/r = 0 line.
The boundary between the two regions crosses the Γ = 0
line at the location we have determined analytically, and
tends to a straight line as p → ∞, as shown in Fig. 4.
It is in fact possible to demonstrate this analytically, see
Appendix A2 for details.
Based on this result we can estimate that the size, A, of
the unstable region in the α/β−Γ plane as shown in Fig.
5 (restricted to −1 ≤ Γ ≤ 0). As the number of players
p increases this area grows as
A ≈
√
e(p− 1) (25)
as shown in Fig. 5.
Thus, in the case where Γ < 0 and p → ∞, the unsta-
ble region takes over the entire parameter space. That
is, in situations where the players’ payoffs are anticor-
related, their behavior will always be complex and will
never settle down on an equilibrium.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN THEORY AND
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We now compare the numerical results to the theoretical
predictions. We measure the stability boundary in the
numerical experiments by determining whether or not
the system converges to a unique fixed point, indepen-
dent of initial conditions. To do this we choose a set of
parameters and initial conditions, iterate the dynamics
for a large number of time steps, and apply heuristics to
check whether the players’ strategies have converged to
a fixed point. If we find a fixed point, we repeat this for
many different initial conditions and check to see whether
we always find the same fixed point. We also perform a
similar procedure to check for limit cycles. The precise
methods we use are discussed in detail in appendix A3.
9FIG. 4. Stability boundaries of the effective dynamics for
several values of p as a function of α/β and Γ, for the case
where Γ < 0. Each curve is the stability boundary for the
stated value of p. To the left of any curve the fixed point of
the effective dynamics is unstable, to the right it is stable.
The key result is that the stability boundary moves to the
left as p increases, so the size of the regime with complex
dynamics grows.
FIG. 5. Plot showing the area of the unstable region for neg-
ative Γ as a function of the number of players, p. This area is
estimated numerically using Gaussian quadrature on results
obtained for β = 0.01; this is valid in the limit as N → ∞.
The analytic estimate of the area is
√
e(p− 1), see Eq. (25).
This indicates that the area of the parameter space with com-
plex dynamics goes to infinity proportional to
√
p as p→∞.
Fig. 6 shows how the likelihood of converging to a unique
stable fixed point varies throughout the negative-Γ region
of parameter space for different values of N and p. The
values we choose are roughly at the limit of what was
computationally feasible. We investigate p = 2, 3, 4, 5,
which constrains the corresponding values of N to be
N = 50, 12, 6, 4. We then sweep Γ and α with β = 0.05
and construct a heat map showing the likelihood of con-
vergence to a unique stable fixed point. We then compare
(a) p = 2, N = 50.
(b) p = 3, N = 12.
(c) p = 4, N = 6.
(d) p = 5, N = 4.
FIG. 6. Probability of convergence to a fixed point as a func-
tion of the memory parameter α and the competition pa-
rameter Γ. For each set of parameters we iterate the system
from 500 random initial conditions. The heat maps show the
fraction that converged to a fixed point (convergence criteria
discussed in Appendix A3). Black means 100% convergence,
red (grey) indicates the majority converge, yellow a minority,
and white no convergence. The unstable region extends to
larger values of α as the number of players is increased. The
solid curves are derived from a generating functional analysis
(N → ∞, see Sec. IV.3), and separate the region in which a
unique stable fixed point is to be expected in this limit (to the
right of the green curves) from regions in parameters space
where the behavior is more complex.
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this to the stability line predicted by the generating func-
tional approach described in the previous section.
The heat map of Fig. 6 is constructed so that black cor-
responds to convergence to a stable fixed point 100% of
the time, red (grey) to convergence roughly 50%− 70%,
yellow (light grey) 10% − 35%, and white to the case in
which unique stable fixed points are never found. The be-
havior is consistent with what we described schematically
in Fig. 3(b): Unique stable fixed points are more likely
for higher α (i.e. short memory) and the size of the sta-
ble region grows with increasing Γ. The region in which
complex dynamics are observed grows as p increases; in
particular for the zero-sum case where Γ = −1 the size of
the interval corresponding to complex dynamics is finite
and growing with p.
The correspondence between the predicted vs. the ob-
served stability boundary gets better as N increases. For
p = 2, where we can make N = 50, the correspondence
is quite good (Fig. 6(a)); for p = 5, where we are only
able to make N = 4, the correspondence is not as good
(Fig. 6(d)); the stability line scales more or less tracks
the numerically-observed boundary, but is consistently to
the right of it. Given that N = 4 N =∞, it is not sur-
prising that the approximation is not perfectly accurate.
We hypothesize that this is due to finite size effects. To
test this, in Fig. A4 in the Appendix we hold the num-
ber of players constant at p = 2 and systematically vary
N . We find the correspondence between theory and ex-
periment improving with increasing N . In addition the
behavior becomes crisper in the sense that the transi-
tion from certain convergence to a unique fixed point to
never converging to a unique fixed point happens more
suddenly when N becomes large. This indicates that the
generating function methods gives reasonably good pre-
dictions for large N , lending confidence to its reliability
in the limit as N →∞.
VI. CHAOS AND VOLATILITY CLUSTERING
Before concluding we would like to make a few notes
about chaos and volatility clustering. We have so far
asserted that much of the behavior in the competitive
region where Γ < 0 is chaotic, without presenting any
evidence. In fact we have done extensive computation of
Lyapunov exponents using the procedures described in
Galla and Farmer [12]. While we experience some numer-
ical problems we can nonetheless state with confidence
that the preponderance of the complex dynamics to the
right of the stability line corresponds to chaos. Problems
arise because it can sometimes be difficult to numerically
distinguish chaos and limit cycles without making very
long simulations, and because of the metastable chaos ob-
served in Fig. 2, which means that in any given simulation
there is a small but nonzero probability that the simula-
tion will eventually collapse to a fixed point. Nonetheless,
most of the time we observe chaos, and as p increases it
tends to be of higher dimension. To prove our main point
FIG. 7. Time series of the changes in the sum of the play-
ers’ payoffs for a game with three-players. This corresponds
to high dimensional chaos and clustered volatility. By this
we mean the tendency for time variability to be positively
autocorrelated, with periods of relative calm and periods of
relative variability.
here and compare to the theory we only needed to deter-
mine whether or not we observe convergence to a unique
fixed point, which is much easier computationally, so we
have chosen not to present evidence based on Lyapunov
exponents.
In the chaotic regime we consistency observe clustered
volatility, similar to that reported for p = 2 by Galla
and Farmer. By this we mean that the fluctuation in
payoffs to the players fluctuates in time in a way that
is “clustered”, i.e. positively autocorrelated. There are
epochs in which the payoffs are relatively steady and
other epochs in which they are highly variable, as shown
in Fig. 7. For p > 2 the chaos tends to be higher dimen-
sional and the clustered volatility stronger. Clustered
volatility is common in many real-world situations, in-
cluding financial time series; our work here suggests that
this may be a generic result for games in which players
learn their strategies using procedures similar to EWA.
We conjecture that this is connected to the tendency for
a given action to vary from being used frequently for long
periods of time to being almost never used, as observed
in Fig. 1(c), but this remains to be investigated.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary we have characterized the outcome of adap-
tive learning in complex multi-player games with Gaus-
sian random payoff matrices. The learning dynamics we
have simulated is a special case of experience-weighted
attraction learning used in behavioral economics. We
see different types of dynamical behavior: convergence
to fixed points, limit cycles and chaotic trajectories.
Broadly speaking, convergence to a unique stable equi-
librium is observed when players’ learning neglects out-
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comes from the distant past, i.e. when they forget
quickly, corresponding to large values of α/β. In con-
trast, when they have a long memory, i.e. small α/β,
we observed more complex dynamics. The nature of this
dynamics depends on how competitive the game is. For
competitive games (i.e. with Γ < 0) the complex dynam-
ics exhibits itself as a limit cycle or chaotic attractor. For
cooperative games (i.e. with Γ > 0) the complex dynam-
ics exhibits itself as a multiplicity of fixed points. The
boundaries between these behaviors become sharper as
N increases.
The main focus of this paper was to study the properties
of games with more than two players. For two players we
replicate the results of Galla and Farmer [12]. For more
than two players we are not able to simulate situations
with a very large number of actions due to computational
constraints, e.g. for p = 3 players the largest number of
actions we simulated was N = 12. To clearly understand
the behavior for large p and large N we rely on an ana-
lytic treatment, which allows us to estimate the stability
boundary in the limit as N → ∞. Based on tools from
the theory of disordered systems, we have carried out
a generating-functional analysis of the continuous-time
limit of EWA learning, and we have derived approximate
semi-analytical results for the onset of stability for games
with an infinite number of strategies and with an arbi-
trary finite number of players, p. These results reveal
that the parameter range in which learning cannot be
expected to settle down to fixed points increases as the
number of players in the game grows. This is summarized
in Figs. 4 and 5. In contrast to the Galla and Farmer
paper, where the analytic results were just making the
numerical results more rigorous, here the analytic meth-
ods were essential to understand the behavior for large
p.
In the introduction we posed our objective as seeking
a “Reynolds number” for estimating the a priori likeli-
hood of complex dynamics, in much the same way that
the Reynolds number characterizes turbulence in fluid
flow. Indeed the parameter r = β/α characterizing the
timescale of the learning process does a reasonably good
job in this context: As r gets bigger, complex dynam-
ics becomes more likely. The transition also depends on
the competitiveness of the game, characterized by Γ, as
well as the number of players. Our key result here is
that complex dynamics become more likely as the num-
ber of players increases. This is not surprising given that
games with more players are more complicated, and per-
haps also more complex, in the sense that there are more
factors to take into account and more inherent degrees of
freedom.
The standard theoretical approach in economics assumes
convergence to an equilibrium from the outset. Our re-
sults here suggest that under circumstances where the
players have a long memory of the past, this approach
may be inherently flawed. This is particularly true when
there are many agents. Our results suggest that there
may be large regimes in which the assumption of a unique
equilibrium is completely invalid, and where approaches
that can accommodate chaotic dynamics, such as agent-
based modeling, are needed. Of course in this paper
we have only studied one family of learning algorithms,
and we have focused on games with many actions. More
work is needed to give a definitive answer to the question
above.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A1: Generating functional analysis
Following [7, 12], we perform a generating functional analysis of the Sato-Crutchfield dynamics (i.e., the continuous
limit of EWA). This will lead to an effective dynamics that is representative of the continuous limit of the EWA system,
for large values of N , for typical realizations of the payoffs, and after averaging over the ensemble of random games.
The fixed points of the effective dynamics are far easier to study analytically than those of the the Sato-Crutchfield
equations for any particular random game.
Consider the dynamics
x˙µi (t)
xµi (t)
= −r−1 lnxµi (t) +
∑
iµ+1,...,iµ−1
Πµi,iµ+1,...,iµ−1
∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t)− ρµ(t) + hµi (t). (A1)
This is identical to the Sato-Crutchfield dynamics (4), except that we have added arbitrary functions hµi (t) to generate
response functions—these will later be set to zero. Recall that the normalization term ρµ(t) is defined such that the
xµi (t) have mean 1.
We define a generating functional
Z[ψ] =
∫
D[x] δ(equations of motion) exp
i∑
µ,i
∫
dt xµi (t)ψ
µ
i (t)
 , (A2)
where δ(equations of motion) is used to mean that the integral is performed over realizations of (A1). Writing these
delta functions in Fourier form yields
Z[ψ] =
∫
D[x, x̂] exp
(
i
∑
µ,i
∫
dt
{
x̂µi (t)
(
x˙µi (t)
xµi (t)
+ r−1 lnxµi (t)−
∑
iµ+1,...,iµ−1
Πµi,iµ+1,...,iµ−1
∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t) + ρ
µ(t)− hµi (t)
)
+ xµi (t)ψ
µ
i (t)
})
. (A3)
The factor in this expression depending on the payoff elements is
ZΠ = exp
−i ∑
µ,i1,...,ip
∫
dtΠµiµ,iµ+1,...,iµ−1 x̂
µ
iµ
(t)
∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t)
 . (A4)
Averaging this over the payoff elements gives
ZΠ =
∏
i1,...,ip
exp
{
− 1
2Np−1
∑
µ
∫
dt
∫
dt′
[
x̂µiµ(t)x̂
µ
iµ
(t′)
( ∏
κ6=µ
xκiκ(t)
)( ∏
λ6=µ
xλiλ(t
′)
)
+Γ
∑
ν 6=µ
x̂µiµ(t)x̂
ν
iν (t
′)
( ∏
κ 6=µ
xκiκ(t)
)(∏
λ 6=ν
xλiλ(t
′)
)]}
, (A5)
which can be written as
ZΠ = exp
{
− N
2
∫
dt
∫
dt′
∑
µ
(
Lµ(t, t′)
∏
κ6=µ
Cκ(t, t′) + Γ
∑
ν 6=µ
Kµ(t, t′)Kν(t′, t)
∏
κ/∈{µ,ν}
Cκ(t, t′)
)}
, (A6)
where we have introduced the functions
Cµ(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i
xµi (t)x
µ
i (t
′),
Kµ(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i
xµi (t)x̂
µ
i (t
′),
Lµ(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i
x̂µi (t)x̂
µ
i (t
′). (A7)
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We can use the expression (A6) in (A3), introducing the functions Cµ, Kµ, and Lµ into the integral using delta
functions, for example
1 =
∫
D[Cµ]
∏
t,t′
δ
(
Cµ(t, t′)− 1
N
∑
i
xµi (t)x
µ
i (t
′)
)
=
∫
D[Cµ, Ĉµ] exp
(
iN
∫
dt
∫
dt′ Ĉµ(t, t′)
(
Cµ(t, t′)− 1
N
∑
i
xµi (t)x
µ
i (t
′)
))
. (A8)
The generating functional becomes
Z[ψ] =
∫
D[C, Ĉ,K, K̂, L, L̂] exp(N(ψ + Φ + Ω)), (A9)
where
Ψ = i
∑
µ
∫
dt
∫
dt′
(
Ĉµ(t, t′)Cµ(t, t′) + K̂µ(t, t′)Kµ(t, t′) + L̂µ(t, t′)Lµ(t, t′)
)
(A10)
results from the introduction of C, K, and L into the integral,
Φ = −1
2
∑
µ
∫
dt
∫
dt′
(
Lµ(t, t′)
∏
κ6=µ
Cκ(t, t′) + Γ
∑
ν 6=µ
Kµ(t, t′)Kν(t′, t)
∏
κ/∈{µ,ν}
Cκ(t, t′)
)
(A11)
results from the average over the payoff elements, and
Ω =
1
N
∑
µ,i
ln
{∫
D[xµi , x̂µi ] pµi,0(xµi (0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt xµi (t)ψ
µ
i (t)
)
exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂µi (t)
(
x˙µi (t)
xµi (t)
+
1
r
lnxµi (t) + ρ
µ(t)− hµi (t)
))
× exp
[
− i
∫
dt
∫
dt′
(
Ĉµ(t, t′)xµi (t)x
µ
i (t
′) + K̂µ(t, t′)xµi (t)x̂
µ
i (t
′) + L̂µ(t, t′)x̂µi (t)x̂
µ
i (t
′)
)]}
(A12)
contains the integral over x and x̂. Here, pµi,0(·) represents the initial distribution of xµi .
In the limit as N → ∞, the integrals in (A9) can be performed using the saddle-point method. Extremising the
exponent with respect to Cµ, Kµ, and Lµ gives the relations
iĈµ(t, t′) =
1
2
∑
ν 6=µ
(
Lν(t, t′)
∏
κ/∈{µ,ν}
Cκ(t, t′) + Γ
∑
κ/∈{µ,ν}
Kν(t, t′)Kκ(t′, t)
∏
λ/∈{µ,ν,κ}
Cλ(t, t′)
)
,
iK̂µ(t, t′) = Γ
∑
ν 6=µ
Kν(t, t′)
∏
κ/∈{µ,ν}
Cκ(t, t′),
iL̂µ(t, t′) =
1
2
∏
κ6=µ
Cκ(t, t′), (A13)
while extremisation with respect to Ĉµ, K̂µ, and L̂µ leads to
Cµ(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈xµi (t)xµi (t′)〉Ω ,
Kµ(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈xµi (t)x̂µi (t′)〉Ω ,
Lµ(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈x̂µi (t)x̂µi (t′)〉Ω , (A14)
where 〈·〉Ω represents a mean taken against a measure defined by Ω, see for example the Supplemental Material of
[12] for details in a similar calculation for p = 2.
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It can also be seen, from the definition of the generating functional, that we have
Cµ(t, t′) = − lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
δ2Z[ψ]
δψµi (t)δψ
µ
i (t
′)
∣∣∣∣∣
ψ=h=0
,
Kµ(t, t′) = − lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
δ2Z[ψ]
δψµi (t)δh
µ
i (t
′)
∣∣∣∣∣
ψ=h=0
,
Lµ(t, t′) = − lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
δ2Z[ψ]
δhµi (t)δh
µ
i (t
′)
∣∣∣∣∣
ψ=h=0
. (A15)
Because of normalization, Z[ψ = 0] = 1 for all h, so Lµ(t, t′) = 0 ∀t, t′. Due to causality, we have Kµ(t, t′) = 0 for
t′ > t, so that Kµ(t, t′)Kν(t′, t) = 0.
This leaves Ψ + Φ = 0, and if we set ψ = 0, and assume identical perturbations hµi (t) = h(t) and initial distributions
pµi,0(x) = p0(x) for all players and strategy components, then we have
Ω = p ln
{∫
D[x, x̂] p0(x(0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂(t)
(
x˙(t)
x(t)
+
1
r
lnx(t) + ρ(t)− h(t)
))
× exp
[
−
∫
dt
∫
dt′
(
Γ(p− 1)K(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t)x̂(t′) + 1
2
C(t, t′)p−1x̂(t)x̂(t′)
)]}
(A16)
where we have dropped the distinction between different players and strategy components. Each degree of freedom
then has an effective generating functional
Zeff =
∫
D[x, x̂] p0(x(0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂(t)
(
x˙(t)
x(t)
+
1
r
lnx(t) + ρ(t)− h(t)
))
× exp
[
−
∫
dt
∫
dt′
(
ΓK(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t)x̂(t′) +
1
2
C(t, t′)p−1x̂(t)x̂(t′)
)]
. (A17)
Defining G(t, t′) = −iK(t, t′), we have
Zeff =
∫
D[x, x̂] p0(x(0)) exp
(
i
∫
dt x̂(t)
(
x˙(t)
x(t)
+
1
r
lnx(t) + ρ(t)− h(t)
))
× exp
[
−
∫
dt
∫
dt′
(
iΓG(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t)x̂(t′) +
1
2
C(t, t′)p−1x̂(t)x̂(t′)
)]
, (A18)
which is identical to the generating functional of the effective dynamics
x˙(t)
x(t)
= Γ
∫
dt′G(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t′)− 1
r
lnx(t)− ρ(t) + η(t) + h(t), (A19)
where η(t) is a Gaussian random variable satisfying 〈η(t)η(t′)〉∗ = C(t, t′)p−1 and 〈η(t)〉∗ = 1, and the functions G
and C are determined by
G(t, t′) =
〈
δx(t)
δh(t′)
〉
∗
,
C(t, t′) = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉∗ , (A20)
with 〈·〉∗ used to denote an average over the effective dynamics (A19). Finally setting h to zero, the effective system
is
x˙(t)
x(t)
= Γ
∫
dt′G(t, t′)C(t, t′)p−2x(t′)− 1
r
lnx(t)− ρ(t) + η(t). (A21)
with G, C, and η defined as above.
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Appendix A2: Onset of instability in the large-p limit
Writing n = p−1 for convenience, the boundary of the stable region is given by the solution of the following equations:
1
r
lnx− Γqn−1χx− qn/2z + ρ = 0,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
∂x
∂z
= qn/2χ,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x2 = q∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x = 1∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
(
∂x
∂z
)2
=
q
n
, (A1)
where Dz is a shorthand for the standard Gaussian measure Dz = dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2.
For Γ = 0 the order parameters at the boundary of the stable region are given by Eq. (24). As an ansatz for the
region with Γ < 0 we assume that the order parameters and the value of r on the phase boundary scale with n in the
same way as they do for Γ = 0. We can write
q = 1 + n−1q′,
χ = n−
1
2χ′,
r = n−
1
2 r′,
ρ = n−
1
2 ρ′, (A2)
where all primed variables are of order O(n0).
If we also write x = 1 + n−
1
2x′, and retain only leading-order terms in q′, χ′, r′, and ρ′ t we obtain from Eq. (A1):
1
r′
ln
(
1 + n−
1
2x′
)
− n− 12 (1 + q′/2)z + n−1ρ′
−n−1Γ(1 + q′)χ′ − n− 32 Γ(1 + q′)χ′x′ = 0,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
∂x′
∂z
=
(
1 +
q′
2
)
χ′,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x′2 = q′,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz x′ = 0,∫ ∞
−∞
Dz
(
∂x′
∂z
)2
= 1 +
q′
n
. (A3)
The linear term in x′ in the first of these equations is dominated by the log term except at large x. Specifically, by
using the approximation W−1(y) ≈ ln(−y) as y → ∞, it can be seen that the linear term reaches the size of the log
term when the value of x′, to leading order, is
x′ ≈ xl = n
3
2 lnn
−Γr′(1 + q′)χ′ , (A4)
while to leading order z is
z ≈ zl = n
1
2 lnn
r′
(
1 + q
′
2
) (A5)
It remains only to show that the region of the real line beyond zl makes a vanishing contribution to the integrals in
Eqs. (A3). By ignoring the linear term for z < zl, and the log term for z > zl, the integrals over these two regions
can be approximated analytically. In each case, the z > zl contribution shrinks more quickly as n grows.
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Neglecting the linear term in the first relation in Eq. (A3) altogether is equivalent to making the approximation x = 1
in the linear term in the first equation of (A1). This yields a system of the same form as the Γ = 0 special case,
except for an additional constant term, which can be solved exactly in the same manner. So, to leading order, the
parameters r, χ, and q take constant values along the stability curve for large p, while ρ takes the value
ρ =
(
1
2
+ Γ
)√
e
n
. (A6)
This value for ρ scales with n in the same way as it does in our ansatz, so the ansatz is indeed valid for all negative
values of Γ. This demonstrates that r =
√
e(p− 1) is a solution of the equations for the onset of instability in the
limit of large p.
Appendix A3: Heuristic classification of the dynamic behavior
It is not necessarily straightforward to classify the long-term behavior of even low-dimensional dynamical systems
using empirical data. For high-dimensional systems such as the EWA dynamics for games with large number of players
and/or strategies this task can be extremely challenging.
We experience two major difficulties. Firstly, in some regions of parameter space, transient behavior can last for a
very long time, and can appear chaotic for all intents and purposes even though the system eventually reaches a stable
fixed point. Secondly, characterising chaos using Lyapunov exponents or measures of dimension can be problematic
for such large systems. the Jacobians of the system for example can be badly conditioned.
However, these difficult cases are not the norm, and we can use heuristics to classify behavior as convergence to a
stable fixed point, convergence to a limit cycle, or chaos, with a high degree of accuracy.
For a given set of parameters and initial conditions, we iterate the EWA system for a maximum of 500000 time steps,
split into batches of 10000 steps. After each batch, we explicitly check for the appearance of fixed points or limit
cycles. If the relative difference between the maximum and minimum values of each strategy component was less than
1%, we assume a stable fixed point has been found. If there is a τ such that all of xµi (t+ τ), x
µ
i (t+ 2τ), etc. (where
t was the time at the start of the batch) have components within 0.1% of the components of xµi (t), then we assume
a stable limit cycle has been found. Otherwise, we continue to the next batch. If convergence has not been detected
after 500000 time steps, we assume the system is chaotic.
This heuristic was used to produce the plots in Figs. 6 and in Appendix A4.
Appendix A4: Further numerical results: limit cycles and multiplicity of fixed points
1. Competitive games (Γ < 0)
In Fig. A1 we show the likelihood of converging to a limit cycle for games with negatively correlated payoff matrix
elements, i.e. games in which players compete agains each other (Γ < 0). For intermediate values of α, just smaller
than those for which stable fixed points are ubiquitous, limit cycles are seen very commonly. However, at small values
of α, fixed points or limit cycles are achieved only rarely—chaos is the norm.
2. Positively correlated payoffs (Γ > 0)
For positive values of the competition parameter, chaotic dynamics is rarely observed (though chaotic-appearing
transients are frequently seen). Instead, for smaller values of α and Γ, limit cycles are very common, as shown in Fig.
A2. In the rest of this region, EWA consistently converges to a fixed point. However, for small values of α and large
values of Γ, there are many distinct fixed points that the dynamics can converge to for a given payoff matrix. This is
shown in Fig. A3.
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p = 2 p = 3
p = 4 p = 5
FIG. A1. Heat maps showing the fraction of 500 random initial conditions for which the EWA system converged to a limit
cycle according to the heuristic in Appendix A3, for negative Γ. Limit cycles appear in a narrow band at intermediate values
of α. The green curves show the boundaries of the stable region as derived in section IV.3.
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p = 2, N = 50 p = 3, N = 12
p = 4, N = 6 p = 5, N = 4
FIG. A2. Heat maps showing the fraction of 500 random initial conditions for which the EWA system converged to a limit cycle
according to the heuristic in Appendix A3, for positive Γ. Limit cycles appear most commonly when the payoffs are weakly
correlated.
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p = 2, N = 50 p = 3, N = 12
p = 4, N = 6 p = 5, N = 4
FIG. A3. Heat maps showing the fraction of 20 independent payoff matrices for which the EWA dynamics converged to multiple
distinct fixed points for different initial conditions. For each payoff matrix, the EWA system was iterated for 100 different initial
conditions, with fixed points being detected as explained in Appendix A3. Fixed points were considered to be identical if the
relative distance between each component was less than 0.1.
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(a) p = 2, N = 10.
(b) p = 2, N = 20.
p = 2, N = 50
p = 2, N = 100
FIG. A4. Heat maps showing the dependence on N of the stable region for p = 2 and Γ < 0. For each set of parameters
the system was iterated for 500 random initial conditions. The heat maps show the fraction that converged to a fixed point
(numerical convergence criteria are described in Appendix A3). The size of the unstable region grows with the size N of the
payoff matrix, but begins to converge around N = 50. The green curves are the stability curves as derived in section IV.3.
